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Principal and Income
and Some Court Decisions thereon of Interest to the
Accountancy Profession.
By William F. Weiss, C. P. A.

The presentation of a very able and lucid paper on “ Contents
and Modes of Stating Executors’ Accounts,” and the subsequent
discussion of this subject at our last meeting, suggested to me
to-night’s meeting as opportune to devote some special attention
to that always important feature in executors’ and trustees’
accounts, the definition and distinction of:—
Principal and Income.

The subject is in reality very largely a part of the law of
trusts, expressed and implied, with which, however, we are bound
to be frequently confronted in the course of our work. It is
hardly necessary for me to say, therefore, that this is not an
attempt to present a legal paper, but to discourse upon and re
view the subject as an accountant, in the interest of the practice
of accountancy. From our point of view and treatment it might
be conveniently divided into two .sections:
1. The practice and principles, in distinction of principal and
income, generally prevailing and accepted.
2. Distinctions which present complications and which have
given occasion for numerous and varying interpretations by
different courts.
As to the latter more particularly, I shall quote some rulings
and decisions of the courts, the language and tenor of which will
prove of interesting information and of assistance in our practice.
You will realize with me that I cannot, by this compilation, enable
the accountant to settle every point with which he may be con
fronted in actual practice, but it is merely my endeavor to increase
5

our store of general knowledge and of legal decisions in this
branch, in order to direct when occasion arises, our inquiries and
researches in the proper channels, to promote accord and coopera
tion of lawyer and accountant and to generally promote the
intelligence and efficiency of our services, and, not least, to pre
vent the accountant from making up accounts or schedules which
may seem to him to be in accordance with common law or
common sense, but which might not be in accordance with
rulings or interpretations of the courts.
Allow me to state that in this compilation I had reference to
and quote or abstract from:—
Edwin A. Howes, Jr.’s " American Law Relating to Principal
and Income.”
Joseph Hardcastle’s “Accounts of Executors and Trustees”
“ The Care of Estates” by Frederick Trevor Hill.
" The Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure” “ (Cyc.) ”
" The Encyclopedia of Accounting ” edited by George Lisle
and published by Wm. Green & Sons, Edinburgh.
“The Apportionment Act of 1870 of England.”
Various “New York Reports of Cases in the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York.”
U. S. Reports—Vol. 136—of the case of Gibbons vs. Mahon
in the Supreme Court of the United States.

SECTION I.
a. Principal is the capital or corpus of the estate or trust, and
is neither the cost value nor cash value at the time of appraisal,
but the actual property itself in which it may be invested at the
time.
b. Capital: We are all' familiar with the broad, common
place definitions of capital being the surplus of assets over liabili
ties, and the indebtedness of a business to its proprietors. Owing
to the occasionally indefinite and confusing use of the word
“ capital ” with respect to corporations, I have selected some
definitions which appear of particular interest in respect of the
court’s decisions in the case of Gibbons vs. Mahon; McLouth vs.
Hunt; and Lowry vs. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., cited later
herein. In “ People vs. Roberts, 66 N. Y. App. Div. 157, 159; 72
N. Y. Supp., 950,” capital is defined “ as the property of a cor
poration contributed by its shareholders or otherwise obtained
6

by it to the extent required by its charter.” Although the terms
capital and capital stock are used convertibly, there is a difference
between them. Capital stock in its strict significance exists only
nominally (Hannibal, etc., R. Co. vs. Shocklett, 30 Mo., 550,558)
and remains fixed, while the capital or actual property of the
corporation varies in value and is constantly increasing or
diminishing in amount. (State vs. Morristown F. Assn., 23
N. J. L. 195, 196; Wells vs. Green Bay, etc., Canal Co., 90 Wis.
442, 64 N. W., 69.)
The word capital is also in general use as signifying the
sums paid in by the subscribers with the additions of all gains or
profits realized with such diminutions as have resulted from losses
incurred in transacting business. (Weatherbee vs. Baker, 35
N. J. Eq., 501-505; People vs. New York, 23 N. Y., 192, 219;
Tradesman Pub. Co. vs. Car Wheel Co., 95 Tenn., 634, 653,
32 S. W., 1097.)
While some courts have used the word capital to mean what
may be called for the sake of clearness the “ fundamental capital,”
some opinions have used the term to include all the property of
the corporation, and some appear not to distinguish between
capital in respect of assets and capital stock in respect of liabili
ties, the foregoing definitions will be of interest to the practitioner
of accountancy for the clearer appreciation of some of the later
herein quoted decisions.
c. Profits on Sales of Bonds are held as belonging to
principal. (Matter of Gerry, 103 N. Y., 445.)
d. Profits on Sales of Shares of Stock are held as belonging
to principal. A decision in the case of Smith vs. Hooper (95
Md., 16) has a particular bearing on this subject and is appended
hereto.
e-1. Wasting Principal or Wasting Values: It is held that the
principal must not be consumed by the income. Persons entitled
to the use of income for life, or a limited time (the life tenant),
or the trustee holding property for the remainderman but under
directions to pay the income to a life tenant, must provide for
repairing the waste of the principal or corpus of the estate, which
comes from its use or lapse of time, and preserve it intact from
the ordinary process of waste, by deductions from income. Here
on is founded our general practice of charging the regular
ordinary maintenance of property against income.
7

A feature, however, requiring special care and attention,
arises whenever payments to a life tenant, of what may be in the
will or instrument of trust called “ income,” reduce the value of
the investment as in quarries, mines, timber lands, oil wells, etc.;
or, where the value of investment decreases by mere lapse of
time, as in leaseholds, part of the income may in such cases have
to be added to the principal to repair or offset the waste, accord
ing to the expressed or implied intention of the creator of the
trust. He may have considered the product from such proper
ties income, without realizing that it is not real income but part
of the property itself. If the intention has been determined to
imply preservation of the corpus or provision for an offset to
waste, the accountant may have to charge the income periodically
with an equitably apportioned replacement fund to provide for
such offset or preservation.
e-2. Bond Premiums belong also under this class of wasting
property; the bond premium of a bond purchased by a trustee
above par being the wasting part of the investment. This can be
provided for by deducting from the income from collections of
interest a sufficient amount to replace the premium at maturity
of the bonds. Jurisdictions differ, some holding for and some
against the use of any part of the income to replace a premium.
But the interpretation of the testator’s intentions naturally
controls. (See various court rulings appended hereto.)
f. Loss of Principal: It is a principle generally accepted and
recognized that loss of principal of an investment is chargeable
against the corpus and loss of income chargeable against income.
Loss of principal by unfortunate investment or by misappropria
tion of the corpus must ordinarily be borne by the principal;
but occasions may arise where the loss is to be apportioned be
tween principal and income, as, for instance, in case of a fore
closure of mortgage, which results in loss of income, and when
foreclosed property is sold, also in loss of principal. (Case of
Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. vs. Donnelly, 55 At. Rep., 93;
N. J. Ch., 1903; Meldon vs. Devlin, 31 App. Div. N. Y., 146.)
In corresponding manner, profit on foreclosures of mortgage has
been held to be apportionable.
g. Taxes assessed on an estate before the death of a testator
constitute a debt of the estate, and are payable out of the corpus
the same as all other debts, even though they are for a period
8

which begins only a few days before his death. (Matter of Bab
cock, 52 Hun, 142.) Special taxes or assessments for permanent
improvements are generally apportioned between principal and
income. Taxes upon unimproved property which produces no
income are generally chargeable against principal. The inheri
tance tax is chargeable against the principal.
h. Alterations and additions constituting investments and en
hancing the value of the property are generally chargeable against
the principal; as are also extraordinary repairs, such as the ex
pense of putting into tenantable condition, property newly pur
chased or otherwise acquired. (Subsequent repairs of that nature
are chargeable to income as ordinary repairs.)
i. Brokerage on the sale or purchase of real estate is in
practice charged to principal because the custom is to treat such
brokerage as a part of the price of the property. (While broker
age on the changes of investment is chargeable to income.)
j. Rights or privileges given to stockholders to subscribe
for new stock at less than its market value have a value in them
selves and belong to the principal, as do the proceeds from the
sale thereof. The gain from such sale will usually be about
balanced by a decrease in value of the old shares.
k. Contracts: The trustees must carry out any contracts
entered into by a testator prior to his death, and any profits re
sulting therefrom will belong to the principal and not to income.
l. Expenses of Administration and Management: The ex
penses of administration of a trust, including trustees’ commis
sions for collecting and paying out the principal, as well as the
expenses of a contest over the probate of the will, or of defending
the estate against claims accrued during the life of the testator,
are chargeable against principal—expenses of this character
should be carefully analyzed and distinguished from the expenses
of managing and carrying out a trust, which latter, including
trustees’ commissions on income, and counsel fees in matters con
cerning management, are chargeable against income.
m. The Cost and Expenses of Suit for interpretation of a
will or trust, are chargeable against principal.
n. Funeral expenses are chargeable against principal.
0. Income: The income of an estate consists of the proceeds
of what the property produces; the receipts or profits which come
from its use in business, accruing either in a given time, or, when
9

unqualified, generally annually. We generally think of and con
sider income in connection with a time specification. It is held
that income must not consume the principal. “ Income ” in execu
tors’ accounts is not to include or embrace increase, which comes
from increase in value, and, while the latter may be profit, it is
in no sense income. (Smith vs. Hooper, 95 Md., 16, court de
cision appending hereto.) The meaning of the word is, however,
not to be determined by an arbitrary rule, but by the meaning and
intention of the testator to be deduced from the language of the
trust created by him.
The general rules and practice of what constitutes income
are well understood by you as to rents, annuities, dividends, in
terest, profits from a testator’s share in a partnership, etc., and I
will only review these various sources of current income briefly
in respect of apportionment.
p. Rents, Annuities, etc.: The New York statutes require
apportionment of rents, annuities and other payments made pay
able or becoming due at fixed periods, so that on the death of
any person interested in such rents, annuities, etc., or in the estate
or fund, or on the determination by any other means of his inter
est, he or his representatives shall be entitled to a proportion of
such rents, etc., according to the time which has elapsed since the
last payment was due. (Code of Civil Procedure N. Y., 2720.)
Under the statute, income of trust estates, except dividends on
shares of stock, is apportioned to the death of the life tenant.
(Matter of Young, 23 Misc. N. Y., 223.)
q. Dividends on shares of stock in corporations based upon
current income (regular dividends) are not apportionable as to
time. Dividends declared before a testator’s death but payable
after, belong to the principal of the estate. (Matter of Ker
nochan, 104 N. Y., 618), but a dividend declared after his death,
though earned before, goes to income. The question of appor
tioning extraordinary dividends is different because it is usually
possible to tell from the company’s periodical reports just when
the profits accrued, by periods of a year or six months. (Extra
ordinary dividends are dealt with in a later section herein.)
r. Interest on debts and loans is apportionable at common
law, being held to accrue from day to day and is therefore not
one entire thing, but is an aggregate of many distinct things.
The Massachusetts courts follow the English courts as to in
10

terest on the public debt, holding that interests on coupon bonds
of all kinds, including those of private corporations, is not ap
portionable on the ground that each coupon constitutes a separate
contract to pay a definite amount at a certain time. The New
York and Pennsylvania courts seem to have taken a different
view and apportion interest on coupon bonds.
s. Profits in a Partnership: It has been decided that profits
are not apportionable. A principal reasoning therefor appears in
the fact that in business profits do not accrue steadily from day to
day and are for this reason incapable of apportionment. Gen
erally, the question of apportionment of the profits of a private
business does not arise on the dissolution of a partnership by the
death of a partner, or as between the estate of a deceased partner
and the continuing partners, but usually arises in cases where a
business is carried on by trustees; and the question is therefore
not one of division of profits as between partners, but as between
the estate of a deceased beneficiary and the succeeding beneficiary.
In the case of profits of a partnership, the important date is
the period for which they are ascertained, not the date on which
they are ascertained. Thus, profits of a partnership for a period
of accounting ending on a certain date belong to the person en
titled to income on that date, even though the profits may not be
ascertained for several months after his interest ceased.
While profits of a partnership are not apportionable, interest
on a partner’s capital is apportionable, following the general rule
of interest.
Charges Against Income.
t. The general rule and practice of charges against income
are equally well understood by you, as expenses of management,
trustees’ commissions on income, ordinary taxes and water rates,
ordinary repairs, insurance, interest on incumbrances, brokerage
on changes of investment (excepting purchase or sale of real
estate), etc.; and care and scrutiny should be exercised by the
accountant in the examination of bills or vouchers and the dates
of their having been incurred, covering such charges, in order that
they may be properly apportioned.
u. Apportionment in General: In apportionment as to prin
cipal and income or of charges as against principal or income,
there is of first importance the intention of the creator of the
trust or testator. The instrument executed by him determines
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what is to go to the life tenant and what to the remainderman.
If the trust instrument does not provide clearly and acceptably
as to apportionment, the general rules will prevail; but, if no
agreement can be reached as to their application, the decision of
the courts will have to be obtained. The date of the death of the
testator, the date of the instrument creating the trust, the date of
the death of the person interested in the income, and the deter
mination by any other means whatsoever of the interest of the
person interested in the income, require important consideration
in this connection. Apportionment with respect to estates, gen
erally speaking, is not as much a matter of calculation as a
matter of arrangement between the parties, as in numerous in
stances the life tenant and remainderman have agreed or united;
but, in case of disagreement, judicial decision will have to be
obtained under consideration of the terms, meaning, and intention
of the will or trust and all circumstances connected with it.
The foregoing covers briefly and in rather a summary form
the subject belonging to that division suggested by me of the
practice and principles in distinction of principal and income
generally prevailing and accepted.
With your leave I now shall take up that other division.

SECTION II.
Of distinctions which present complications and which have
given occasion for numerous and varying interpretations by
different courts.
The question involves almost entirely only dividends on shares
of stock, and more particularly extraordinary dividends.
The question becomes of special interest under the practice
of corporations, more prevalent in recent years than formerly, of
declaring out of accumulated earnings or surplus, stock dividends,
thereby increasing the share capital, or of extraordinary cash
dividends. Such dividends, not being actually paid out of current
earnings, but being in reality a division of the capital of the cor
poration, would seem to constitute part of the principal, and as
such it would seem they should not be treated as income.
Wherever the instrument creating the trust is not thoroughly
clear, and trustee, life tenant, and remainderman appear to be at
variance in construction thereof, judicial decision will have to be
resorted to.
12

Regular dividends can safely be treated as belonging to in
come at the time when they are declared, even though the com
pany may have lost money during the period for which the divi
dends were declared. It is a business policy of the officers of
corporations to have their regular dividends uniform in amount;
for this reason they retain enough of the profits of good years to
make up the deficiency of poor years. As it is the declaration of
the dividend which gives the stockholder a right to it, it is the
general law that the owner of the stock, or the person entitled
to the income of the stock at the time of the regular dividend is
declared, is entitled to the whole dividend; no inquiry being made
as to when the earnings were made, and usually no attempt is
made to apportion regular dividends as to time.
Extraordinary cash dividends. These present much more
perplexing questions, and there would seem to be a hopeless con
flict of authority on several important points involved, as these
extraordinary dividends are usually not based upon current earn
ings. Generally a large portion of the earnings on which such
dividends are based have been accumulated before the shares of
stock came into the hands of the trustee, and were represented in
the value of the shares at the time the trustee acquired them.
While undivided earnings of a corporation are not the prop
erty of the stockholder, and are not income to him while they
remain undivided, he, nevertheless, has an interest in them pro
rata to his stockholdings, as he has in all the property of the cor
poration; and it has been held, as cited in the first paragraph
herein, as to capital, that capital signifies the sums paid in by the
subscribers, with the addition of all gains or profits realized.
The existence of undivided earnings increases the value of each
share of stock, and for this reason they are in one sense capital
of the stockholder.
Stock dividends: These involve to a larger extent the same
arguments and principles as the extraordinary cash dividends,
only more pointedly so, in respect of their appearing as a division
of the capital. The usual reason for the issue of stock dividends
is that the corporation has increased its working capital by the
addition of undivided earnings. Usually the directors of a cor
poration have the right to decide what part of the earnings, if
any, they shall distribute; what part they shall simply accumu
late as a surplus, and what part they shall use in increasing the
13

plant, or in betterments. Any increase in the property of the
corporation, in whatever form, would usually increase propor
tionately the value of the shares of stock. Judge Gray in the case
of Gibbons vs. Mahon, 136 U. S., 549, renders a lengthy opinion
and decision on this subject, which I have here at your dis
posal, but from which at this time I would quote the following:
Reserved and accumulated earnings, so long as they are
held and invested by the corporation, being part of its cor
porate property, it follows that the interest therein repre
sented by each share, is capital, and not income, of that
share, as between the tenant for life and the remainderman
legal or equitable, thereof.......................................................
A stock dividend really takes nothing from the corpora
tion, and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders.
Its property is not diminished, and their interests are
not decreased. After such a dividend, as before, the
corporation has the title in all the corporate property;
the aggregate interests therein of all the shareholders,
are represented by the whole number of shares; and the
proportional interest of each shareholder remains the
same. The only change is in the evidence which represents
that interest, the new shares and the original shares
together representing the same proportional interest that
the original shares represented before the issue of the new
ones.

Numerous other decisions on this subject are available. Those
which appear of particular interest to us are the cases of Mc
Louth vs. Hunt, 154 N. Y., 179; and of Lowry vs. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y., 137, and to which I would par
ticularly direct you. They are too lengthy to be made a part of
this paper, but in a subsequent discussion of this subject I am
prepared to read extracts therefrom. In the case of McLouth vs.
Hunt, it is held:
When a stock dividend declared by a corporation and
allotted to shares of its original capital stock belonging to
a testamentary trust estate, constitutes as a matter of fact
a distribution of accumulated earnings or profits, it rep
resents income and belongs to the life tenant of the trust
estate as between him and the remainderman.

In the case of Lowry vs. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., the case
of McLouth vs. Hunt is referred to and laid down as a precedent,
and it is held:
14

Where a corporation has declared a dividend upon its
capital stock, payable in new stock certificates, if it is
based upon an accumulation of earnings, or profits, by
their distribution in that manner, the stockholders receive
the representative of income and not of capital.
In the former case it is said that these questions (i. e., stock
dividends being principal or income) have been the subject of
discussion in the courts in this country and England for a century.
The decisions though numerous are singularly conflicting and
unsatisfactory. Further emphasizing this apparent conflict in de
cisions, I would also refer you to the cases of Jermain vs. Lake
Shore R. R., 91 N. Y., 483; and Jones vs. Terre Haute R. R.,
57 N. Y., 196, wherein appears laid down the rule that the right
to undivided profits passes with the transfer of shares.
The method of apportionment adopted in Earp’s Appeal, 28
Pa. St., 368, the leading case for this doctrine in Pennsylvania,
was to find the difference in value between the old stock owned
by the trust at the date when the trust was established, and the
old and the new stock together at the time of the stock dividends.
The surplus earnings being left as large as when the trust began,
the increase in value was held to belong to income.
This seems to be the accepted method of apportionment of a
stock dividend in Pennsylvania. No attempt is ever made to
apportion for periods less than those covered by reports of the
annual or semi-annual fiscal periods. In New York some juris
dictions have refused to apportion and give the entire stock
dividend to income, as appears in the cases of McLouth vs. Hunt,
and Lowry vs. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., cited before; also in
Hites Devisee vs. Hites Exec’r., 93 Ky., 257.
Extra issue of securities in consolidation. In the consolida
tion of one corporation with another, where there is an extra issue
of stock or of bonds of the consolidated company for the purpose
of equalizing the interest of shareholders, such surplus issue
remains principal.
You will thus note that the subject of extraordinary dividends,
and particularly of stock dividends, is quite an extensive one and
particularly interesting to us, owing to the number of varying
opinions rendered thereon by different courts. In recent years
suits have been brought against several corporations to distribute
some of their large surplus accumulated from earnings among
15

the stockholders. These questions as to such distributions (in
the form of dividends) being principal or income, are therefore
likely to arise more frequently in the future than in the past. It
is for this reason that I particularly recommend to your attention
the cases, referred to before, of Gibbons vs. Mahon (U. S.
Supreme Court), and the two cases in our Court of Appeals, of
McLouth vs. Hunt and of Lowry vs. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.
In the U. S. Supreme Court case a stock dividend is held to be
principal, in the two cases in the Court of Appeals the stock
dividends involved are held to be income.
The three decisions are particularly noteworthy and the differ
ence in these opinions and the number of other varying opinions,
encourages me to confess that the U. S. Supreme Court decision,
and particularly also the decision referred to therein in the case
of Williams vs. The Western Union Telegraph Co. (Court of
Appeals, 93 N. Y., 162) appeal more to my reasoning and con
ception as an accountant than the other two opinions of the
Court of Appeals.
Even more marked seems the difference of interpretation and
opinion in two cases of dividends declared from so-called “ float
ing capital.” I refer to the two cases of “ Hemenway vs.
Hemenway,” decided in Massachusetts, and of the “ Second
Universalist Church of Stamford vs. Harriet Colegrove,” decided
in Connecticut. Both actions involve practically the same facts,
i. e., the extraordinary cash dividend of the Pennsylvania Coal
Company. The Massachusetts court holds this dividend income;
the Connecticut court holds it principal.
These differences of opinion appear further emphasized in
various other cases referred to in the actions of Lowry vs.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., and of McLouth vs. Hunt.
I venture to say that the possible conflict of opinion may not
have occurred to a number of the testators at the time they exe
cuted the instruments referred to in some of these actions. How
ever, in the language quoted from these instruments, I have not
been able to find anything particularly expressed or implied by
them, to preclude beyond a doubt some of the following assump
tions as to these testators’ possible state of mind, when they
executed these instruments.
First: That their intention was to bequeath to the
life tenant the income that arose after their death.
16

Second: That they felt themselves justified to con
sider, based on precedent and general acceptation, that the
income accumulated up to the time of their death, or at
least to the close of the fiscal period next preceding it,
subject to the deduction of an amount necessary to pay a
regular, or ordinary dividend, was part of the property
or assets of the corporation in which they had part owner
ship in pro rata to their stockholding.
Third: That they must have felt themselves further
justified in the foregoing (second) assumption by finding
this increase of assets from accumulated income rep
resented in the increased market value of their shares
which represented part of the principal of their estate.
Fourth: That they intended to imply that by any in
come stipulated to go to the life tenant, the value of the
original shares stipulated to go to the remainderman,
should not be depreciated and that they were of the wellfounded impression, that a stock dividend, conditions
continuing equally, would depreciate the value of the
original shares.
A stock dividend has been held to be representative of income.
The terms “ capital ” and " capital stock ” would seem to be used
convertibly in some decisions. For a better understanding let us
distinguish in the use of the term capital and substitute the terms
“ assets ” and “ capital stock ” wherever applicable. It will occur
to us also that we consider income always in connection with a
time limitation or a period, and that income is represented in
property or assets. Income, where accumulating in assets, be
comes part of the general corporate property and its accretion
cannot be identified in the assets (excepting in special cases
where it may be set aside and specially invested, as for instance
in the case of the Pennsylvania Coal Co.—to which I referred
before). The amount of the accretion is of course shown and
can be identified in an “ undivided profit ” or “ surplus ” account;
and the interest in such surplus and the assets representing it, is
represented by the capital stock or pro rata by each share thereof.
A stock dividend of, let us say 100 per cent., conditions con
tinuing equally, would reduce the value of the original shares by
one-half. There would thus seem to be room for the argument
that a stock dividend is also representative of assets, and more
particularly representative of the increased value of the original
shares of capital stock heretofore evidenced in the market value,
and as such it would seem to be part of the principal.
17

The following argument does not seem to have been offered,
although there would seem to exist reason for it. If “ rights ” to
subscribe for stock at less than its market value are held to be
principal—and if increases, which come from increase in value,
are held to be principal—why are stock dividends not generally
held to be principal? They would seem in reality to be nothing
more, than official, separately issued evidence of that increase in
value of the original shares, which evidenced itself, before the
stock dividend separated this value from them, merely in the
market value of the original shares.
The stock dividend when analyzed does in fact not seem to
be income at all. The Court of Appeals holds in Williams vs.
Western Union Telegraph Company, 93 N. Y., 192:
After a stock dividend, a corporation has just as much
property as it had before, and the aggregate of the stock
holders own no more interest in the corporation than be
fore the stock dividend. A stock dividend does not
distribute property, but simply dilutes the shares as they
existed before.

Viewed in this light a stock dividend does not appear as a
distribution of profits, and some misconception on the part of
some corporations seems to have prevailed in the language of
their resolutions declaring them. If a stock dividend is held to
be income because it can be converted into money, the previously
offered argument also prevails, that the proceeds of such con
version would seem to remain principal, because the original
shares decreased in value to the extent of the stock dividend.
Let us compare the last quoted decision (Williams vs. West
ern Union Telegraph Co.), holding “a stock dividend does not
distribute property but simply dilutes the shares as they existed
before ” with two others previously quoted by me,
viz: in McLouth vs. Hunt, reciting: “ When a stock dividend
declared by a corporation constitutes as a matter of fact a
distribution of accumulated earnings or profits, it rep
resents income ”;
and in Lowry vs. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., ruling: “ Where
. . . corporation has declared a dividend upon its
capital stock, payable in new certificates, if it is based upon
an accumulation of earnings or profits, by their distribu
tion in that manner the stockholders receive the representa
tive of income and not of capital ”—
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and note the marked difference between the former and the
latter two opinions. I remarked before that we generally con
sider income in connection with a time limitation or as for a
certain period. Endeavoring to analyze the term of income
further, the observation occurs to me, that income, when not
expended or distributed, but allowed to accumulate, becomes
capital or principal, on the reasoning that it produces increased
value, and increased value is held to be principal. This would
seem to apply to the individual as well as to the corporation.
The income which you do not expend becomes your capital and
after your death part of the principal of your estate. In the cor
poration the accumulated income becomes generally part of the
assets or capital employed in the conduct of the business, losing
its identity in items amongst those assets obtained by means of
the original subscribed and paid in capital. Although such in
crease of assets is not the property of any stockholder, while
undivided, the stockholder practically has an equivalent therefor
in the recognized increased market value of his shares which
constitute part of his individual capital. Let us also consider
in connection herewith the accepted doctrine that “ income must
not consume principal.” Now, while the stock dividends in some
instances are considered representative of or representing in
come, or assets accumulated from income, in distinction from the
capital paid in by the subscribers, and are therefore held belong
ing to the life tenant as between him and the remainderman, the
further argument does not seem to me to be precluded or un
founded—that the principal intended by the bequest for the
remainderman would be partially consumed if the stock dividend
did not go to him, because the value of the original shares at the
testator’s death would diminish or be diluted on account of the
stock dividend in pro rata to the amount thereof.

Numerous decisions are influenced by the language and evi
denced intention in the resolutions declaring the dividend, and
conciseness therein on the part of directors will always be of
advantage in the prevention of disagreements or as guidance in
the court’s conclusions.
While the corporate action may not be necessarily
conclusive upon the court with respect to the question, if
it is based upon facts and is not purely arbitrary it will
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and should be controlling.
Trust Co.)

(Lowry vs. Farmers’ Loan &

And again we read in McLouth vs. Hunt:
In this case the resolution recites that the earnings of
the corporation had been withheld from the shareholders
for almost ten years, that they had accumulated and that it
was the intention of the directors in taking such action and
the shareholders in consenting to it, to distribute such
accumulated earnings in the form of stock certificates
instead of money. It was therefore the intent and sub
stance of the corporate action to distribute earnings rather
than apportion additional stock.
The question here seems natural, was the intention to distri
bute earnings rather than apportion additional capital stock
really carried out, when compared with the opinion in Williams
vs. Western Union Telegraph Co. quoted before, “ that a stock
dividend does not distribute property, etc., etc. ? ”
It is not my intention to criticize any of the decisions referred
to, but to increase our familiarity with the subject, as an aid in
our practice, to show to what extent it affords opportunity for
the accountant’s arguments and theories, and to promote accord
and successful cooperation between ourselves and the legal pro
fession. Both can do much in bringing about a generally better
understanding and clearing of complications, by directing the
minds of testators or creators of trusts in the disposition of their
estates to the matters that should receive special consideration
in order to avoid possible conflict of opinion or misinterpretation
particularly as to principal and income. For after all the mean
ing and intention of the creator of that trust, to be determined if
possible from the language employed in the creation of that
instrument, is of first importance.
Considering the subject of principal and income a step further
you will realize with me that a clear conception and interpretation
thereof is not entirely without interest to the corporation and the
investor. Holding stock dividends to be income might readily
affect the attractiveness of a stock as an investment, and, as cor
porations can to some extent influence the interpretation by the
language of their resolutions declaring the dividend, conciseness
therein is therefore of direct interest to themselves.
In introducing this subject to-night I stated it as my purpose
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to merely discourse upon and review it in the interest of the
practice of our profession. From the diversity of opinions
quoted on some of its features, you will realize with me to what
extent therein, care on our part and the dependence upon legal
advice or judicial decisions, may be necessary. There occur to
me at this time the words with which the Hon. Eugene A. Philbin
honored our profession at the annual banquet of The American
Association of Public Accountants in October, 1905, in New
York:
The importance of your profession as affecting every
mercantile interest or as affecting every phase of legal
controversy cannot be overestimated. ... In many
instances we have found in our experience as lawyers that
questions have arisen in commercial matters which were
not susceptible to adjustment according to the ordinary
rules of law. It is there we have found that some able
accountant has advanced a theory and that that theory has
been afterwards confirmed by the court and then added to
our great body of common law. So that in the profession
of the law we are indebted to you for the laws which you
have created and for the laws that you have made and
which have solved many of our difficulties. . . . We
feel that we are closely allied to you.

and those of Mr. John A. Wright at the Banquet at Columbus,
Ohio, last November:
From our point of view you are brethren of the law,
you are in my humble judgment an administrative branch
of the judicial arm of the government. . . . You have
for your purpose the discernment not only of the truth,
where a dispute arises and is pressed in court, but you have
a still higher function; you have a function which enables
you to do justice and prevent disputations. You stand at
the right arm of the Judge in a court of equity. . . .
Justice is made expeditious by the skill which you exert.
You are time savers in the administration of the law, by
your mediations, by the confidence that is reposed in you,
by the accuracy of your determination of facts you pre
vent litigation. . . . you come eventually to do the
refined work of one branch of the administration of justice.
With recalling these words allow me to close and say, let us
always endeavor to merit and justify the recognition and confi
dence bestowed upon us, by the intelligence and efficiency as well
as the thoroughness and impartiality of our work.
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DISCUSSION.
Summed

Mr. Weiss upon Invitation of
President Allen.

up by

Assuming a case where a life tenant has received dividends
based on only about half of the earnings for a great number of
years, the balance of the earnings accumulating meanwhile, and
where a stock dividend is finally declared, this stock dividend
may have to be apportioned between principal and income, pro
rata to the amount of surplus accumulated before the testator’s
death and after it, when the life tenant came into the income.
From the company’s books and financial reports can be readily
determined what the earnings were and when they accumulated,
and equitable apportionment can therefrom be made without
difficulty, but the general rules of apportionment will have to be
followed or a special decision may have to be obtained.
The rules of apportionment, particularly in Pennsylvania and
Connecticut, are quite clear, but they vary in different states and
in some are quite limited, and in many instances therefore it will
be wise to defer to the trustee’s application to the courts for
instruction.
You have heard the question raised regarding a National
Bank with a capital stock of $300,000 and a surplus of over
$6,000,000. The bank increases its capital stock to $3,000,000
through the channel of an extraordinary dividend, having prac
tically the effect of a stock dividend by an arrangement whereunder the dividend is to be applied to subscription for new stock.
Under the condition of its undivided surplus this bank stock has
a market value of about $2,500 per share. It was assumed that a
number of shares of this stock were left by a testator in trust,
providing that the income shall go to a wife or daughter as life
tenants for a certain period, and the stock eventually to go to the
son as the remainderman. The question arises should this
extraordinary dividend be treated as income or principal. Apply
ing the rulings in the two cases cited in the Court of Appeals, this
dividend would be representing or be representative of income
(a distribution of accumulated earnings) and as such would
appear to be income. It seems to me, however, that the testator
did not contemplate or intend to imply that the principal, i. e.,
the original shares left in trust by him, to go to his son as the
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remainderman, should eventually go to him depreciated to one
tenth of their value, as would be the case by this extraordinary
dividend distributing half of the accumulated surplus, and the
increase of the capital from $300,000 to $3,000,000 and of the
shares from 3,000 to 30,000 in numbers. This would seem to me
to be consuming the principal bequeathed by the income, and I
would treat this extraordinary dividend, even assuming it to be
in cash and its application to subscription for new stock only
optional, as principal or advise application to the court for special
decision.
Referring to the case cited of trustees of an estate holding
stock worth 120 which under accumulation of earnings became
worth 150 and was sold at that price. Has the life tenant who
is to receive the income any interest in this accumulation, was the
question. Generally speaking, no; there is no income for the life
tenant unless dividends are declared, and increase in value of
shares is and remains part of the principal, although the increase
in value may be due to accumulation of earnings during the
time when he was entitled to income. But a stockholder, trustee,
or a life tenant has, however, recourse at law to compel a partial
distribution of earnings, if he can prove them as being made, and
where the company for no apparent valid reasons persists in
withholding a distribution of a reasonable part of these earnings.
Such actions have been brought successfully.
In the case of a corporation with a capital of $1,000,000 and a
surplus of $500,000 winding up its affairs and distributing its
assets, the stockholders receive these assets and this distribution
constitutes principal. A liquidation is not a dividend in the sense
of a distribution of earnings. The instance related here to-night,
of profits declared by a syndicate out of stock transactions two
months after the testator, who was a participant, died, proved
very interesting. The testator appeared to have provided for a
separate disposition of the principal of the estate and of the in
come therefrom. Here apportionment was made of these profits,
part of which had accumulated before the testator’s death, a por
tion to income and a portion to principal. It was evident that all
the parties in interest could agree to an adjustment that seemed
equitable to them and no recourse to a decision of the courts was
deemed necessary.
As was quite clearly brought out in the discussion to-night.
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income, as far as the life tenant is concerned, is often neither in
proportion to the earnings during the time when he appears
entitled to income nor to the income which the testator probably
contemplated he should receive; and on the other hand, the prin
cipal as probably conceived by the testator is liable to be affected,
where the language of the will or instrument of trust is not
clear and precise, and there is also not to be overlooked the
possible effect of the language of the resolutions declaring
“ extraordinary ” or “ stock dividends ” upon either principal or
income.
You will realize with me that the subject is an extensive one.
Your active participation in the discussion of it has made an
enjoyable, interesting evening for all of us and I am sure will
occasionally prove of use and benefit in our labors.
After a vote of thanks tendered to Mr. Weiss with applause,
the following resolution was unanimously adopted:
“ That, The paper read by Mr. Weiss, together with the
various decisions of the courts and a summary of the discussion
as a subject of general interest to the accounting profession, be
printed in book form and forwarded by the Secretary of this
society to all the members of The American Association of Public
Accountants.”
The Secretary being instructed to carry this Resolution into
effect, the meeting adjourned.
Attest:
Secretary,
New York State Society, Certified Public Accountants,
277 Broadway.
COURT DECISIONS.
(Original Texts and Extracts)
And Citations from Howes’ “ American Law Relating to
Principal and Income.”
Re: Profits on Sales of Shares of Stock: In Smith vs.
Hooper, 95 Md., 16, a testator had bequeathed $10,000 to a trus
tee to pay the “ dividends and income ” to M. for life. At M.’s
request the trustees used the $10,000 to purchase the property of a
can manufactory. This property was then transferred to a cor
poration, the trustees taking 300 shares of stock in payment.
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They sold half of these shares for $5,000, and invested part of
this $5,000 in stock of another can company. The companies
paid large dividends, which the trustees paid to M. as income.
Both corporations were later absorbed by the A. Co. and, as a
result, the trustees received a large block of shares in the A. Co.
The original trust fund of $10,000 has increased to a value of
$158,000, part of which is proceeds of stock sold and part of
stock received on transfer of the original stock. It was held
that none of this increase could be called income, and that it
belonged wholly to the corpus of the estate. Although there had
been a large profit, the profit came from the increase in value of
stock. “ Increase and income are not synonymous terms. Until
detached or separated from the shares whose value it enhances,
increase forms part of that value, and, therefore, part of the
shares; and if it be part of the shares themselves, then, whilst it
may be profit, it is in no sense income.”
Re: Bond Premiums: It has been held in some jurisdictions
that a trustee who has purchased bonds at a premium should
deduct from the various collections of interest and add to the
principal such sums as will replace the premium if the bonds are
held until maturity. That is, he should establish a sort of sinking
fund to repair the waste of principal. (New England Trust Co.
vs. Eaton, 140 Mass., 532; N. Y. Life Insurance & Trust Co. vs.
Baker, 165 N. Y., 484.)
Other jurisdictions have held that no part of the current in
come should be used to replace a premium. (Hite’s Devisees vs.
Hite’s Ex’r, 93 Ky., 257; Penn-Gaskell’s Estate [No. 2], 208 Pa.
St., 346.) It is argued that gains and losses in the value of
bonds should come within the general rule applied to other
securities: that they are gains and losses in corpus. It is pointed
out that the premiums are not paid to secure greater income, but
usually represent safety and permanency of the investment and
facility of transfer and use, and, in fact, usually accompany a
low rate of interest. It is argued that the premium is paid more
for the interest of the remainderman than for the interest of the
life tenant, and so should be considered as something that the
fund itself should endure, as being a charge for the benefit of
the whole fund. (Penn-Gaskell’s Estate [No. 2], 208 Pa. St.,
346; N. E. Trust Co. vs. Eaton, 140 Mass., 532, 545, dissenting
opinion by Holmes, J.).
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If the main object of a testator appears to have been to pro
vide a liberal income consistent with safety, the courts will incline
to the view that he did not intend any deductions from income to
replace such loss of corpus. (Matter of Hoyt, 160 N. Y., 607.)
A direction by a testator to invest in certain kinds of bonds and
pay to his four sons “ all the dividends and income ” of said
bonds, over and above the expense of carrying out the trust, was
held to indicate an intention that no deductions from income of
such bonds should be made to replace the premiums which the
trustee was obliged to pay. (Shaw vs. Cordis, 143 Mass., 443.)
Where bonds which are rated at a premium are part of the
identical property left by the testator, and the trustees have prop
erly allowed the investment to remain, deductions should not be
made from current income to replace the wasting premium, unless
it appears that the testator intended that such provision should
be made. (Sargent vs. Sargent, 103 Mass., 297. See also Reed
vs. Head, 6 Allen, 174.)
Re: Method of Apportionment: The method of apportion
ment adopted in Earp’s Appeal, the leading case for this doctrine,
was to find the difference in value between the old stock owned
by the trust at the date when the trust was established and the old
and the new stock together at the time of the stock dividend.
The surplus earnings being left as large as when the trust began,
the increase in value was held to belong to income. Thus it was
found that the original 540 shares were worth $67,500 at the time
of the testator’s death. These original shares together with the
810 new shares of the dividend were worth $108,000 at the time
of the stock dividend. The difference, $40,500, representing 506
new shares at market value, was held to be profit which arose
since the death of the testator, and was apportioned entirely to
income, since the stock dividend did not reduce the surplus
earnings below what they were at the beginning of the trust.
This seems to be the accepted method of apportioning a stock
dividend in Pennsylvania. It will be noticed that only a part of
the new shares was given to income, although it was found that
the stock dividend was based wholly upon earnings made while
the trust earned the stock. The life tenant ought never to get
more than the par value of all the new stock issued to his trustee,
although the new stock is worth more than par. The reason that
it is worth more than par is usually because of a large fund of
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undivided earnings which are not being permanently capitalized
and in which it has equal equities with the old stock. The stock
dividend represents a permanent capitalization only of earnings
equal to the par value of the new stock. To illustrate with the
facts of Earp’s Appeal, if the life tenant had been given the
entire issue of 810 shares which sold at 80, he would have had a
dividend of $64,800 in value. The original 540 shares left as
principal would have been worth only $43,200, a shrinkage of
$24,200. Instead, he was given enough of the new stock at its
market value to equal the 810 new shares at $50, the par value.
In making the apportionment the periodical fiscal reports,
usually semi-annual or annual, of the cooperation are usually
taken as showing when the earnings were accumulated, and no
attempt is made to apportion for periods less than those covered
by such reports. (Earp’s Appeal, 28 Pa. St., 368; Thomas vs.
Gregg, 78 Md., 545.)
Re: Dividends from Floating Capital: Earnings do not be
come part of the permanent capital of the corporation by simply
being accumulated and even temporarily invested outside the
business of the company. So long as their identity is preserved
they constitute a fund from which the directors can at discretion
declare a dividend which is a dividend from income of the cor
poration. States which do not apportion extraordinary dividends
would give such a dividend entirely to income. (Matter of
Rogers, 161 N. Y., 108; Hemenway vs. Hemenway, 181 Mass.,
406; see also Quinn vs. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 93 Md. 285.)
Where a company engaged in the business of mining and sell
ing coal had accumulated a large fund of undivided earnings,
part of which stood on its books as a “ Coal Land Renewal
Fund,” and had been held in reserve for the purpose of pur
chasing new mines as the old ones became exhausted, and part
of which was simply surplus profits, most of which fund was
invested to produce income in stocks, bonds, and other securities,
a large cash dividend based upon these accumulated earnings
was held to be a dividend belonging to income. (Hemenway vs.
Hemenway, 181 Mass., 406.)

Decision: It is no doubt true that profits do not of
necessity always remain such, and that they may be con
verted into permanent capital without any formal action
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or declaration on the part of the corporation or its direct
ors. (Minot vs. Paine, 99 Mass., 101.) But they do not
become capital by mere accumulation and accretion except
in special cases and under special charter provisions,
. . . nor by the mere lapse of time, though that may be
the practical effect in cases where, in consequence thereof,
it becomes difficult or impossible to distinguish them from
capital. So long as their identity is preserved, we do not
see why the directors may not regard them as profits and
treat them accordingly ... In order to become capi
tal they should be applied, we think, in some effectual way
to a permanent increase of the property which is used in
the business of the corporation. They may be set aside as
matter of bookkeeping for such a use, but until actually
appropriated to that purpose they remain, it seems to us,
profits, and the corporation and its directors may deal
with them as such. Morton, J., in Hemenway vs. Hemen
way, 181 Mass., 406, 410. (See note below.)

Where a corporation had invested earnings in the purchase of
its own stock held by a trustee, a distribution of this stock to its
shareholders was held to be dividend of income. (Leland vs.
Hayden, 102 Mass., 542.)
Where a manufacturing corporation had retained a large
amount of its earnings, part of which it invested in western lands,
in government bonds, and in railroad stocks, it was held that a
large cash dividend based upon such floating capital belonged to
income. (Matter of Rogers, 161 N. Y., 108; see also Stewart
vs. Phelps, 71 App. Div., 91, 173 N. Y., 621.)
The company referred to herein is the Pennsylvania Coal Company,
and the issue involved is that the payment of that company’s large cash
dividend (an extraordinary dividend) was held a dividend belonging to income
For a different interpretation of the same facts regarding the same
company, where the moneys divided (i. e., the extraordinary cash dividend
of the same company) was held to be capital, see the case here following
of the Second Universalist Church vs. Colegrove (Connecticut).

Re: Dividend

on

Floating Capital.

Statement of Case and Decision:
The Second Universalist Church of Stamford vs. Harriet
Colegrove, New Haven, June term, 1901. A mining company
had set aside and invested, from the proceeds of working its
mines, large sums from time to time, to an amount which finally
exceeded its capital. By concerted, though individual action, the
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shareholders, at the recommendation of the directors, then sold
their shares at a high premium, under a contract with the buyer
by which certain specified assets representing part of this re
served surplus, should.be “reserved out of the interests in said
property passing to the purchasers ” by reason of the transfer
of the shares, and the former shareholders should “ receive the
benefit of said reserved assets.” Provision was then made by the
directors for turning these assets into cash, under management of
trustees appointed for the purpose, and a dividend “ of the said
assets ” payable by these trustees at a future time was voted,
and afterwards paid. Held, that this transaction was substan
tially a liquidation of the affairs of the company as they had been
conducted under the old management, that those receiving the
dividends took them not as shareholders but because they had
formerly been shareholders; and therefore, as between a re
mainderman and the holder of a life interest in shares thus sold,
the moneys divided were capital and not income.
Argued June 4th; decided July 23, 1901.
Amicable suit to determine the rights of the partners in and to
a dividend upon shares of stocks held under a testamentary trust,
brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved
by that court, Robinson (Judge), for the consideration and advice
of the court.
Said Pennsylvania Coal Co. was organized in 1838, and its
organization continued in 1895, by acts of the legislature in
Pennsylvania. The par value of the stock was at the time of
making of the said will, and had been for many years, $5,000,000;
and for many years and at the time of making of the will afore
said, it had paid regular yearly dividends of 16 per cent., being
less than the amount earned. The excess not used for dividends
or in the business of the company was invested in stocks, bonds
and other securities. This excess fund stood upon the books of
the company as a “ Coal Land Renewal Fund,” and as “ Surplus.”
The purpose of the former fund was to replace coal lands owned
by the company which should become mined out, by the pur
chase of other coal lands. On May 30, 1895, the Coal Land Re
newal fund stood upon the books of the company at $4,500,000,
and the surplus at $4,012,701.08.
Baldwin (Judge), The Pennsylvania Coal Company was en
gaged in the business of mining coal. Shares in such company
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are a wasting investment. There are two modes of conducting
its affairs. The capital invested in a mine may be gradually paid
back to the shareholders in the shape of dividends from the pro
ceeds of working it; or part of these proceeds may be retained
for reinvestment from time to time, in the purchase of new mines
to take the place of the old ones as they become exhausted or un
profitable. (Morawetz on Priv. Corp. Paragraph 442, 830.)
The Pennsylvania Coal Company adopted the latter policy.
It established a large “ Coal Land Renewal Fund ” and also put
aside a “ Surplus ” fund, each of which, 1901, was nearly or
quite as large as its capital stock.
The testator contemplated the possibility of a re-organization
of the company, and made a provision for that contingency
. . . There was, in effect, a liquidation of the affairs of the
company, as they had been conducted under the old management.
The dividend declared from these accumulated profits was
not a stock dividend. That mode of distribution was not possible;
for the object of the whole transaction was to cut off the old
shareholders from any future participation in the concerns of the
company. The provisions of the Public Acts of 1889, p. 41, chap.
22, therefore do not apply.
Nor was it a cash dividend. It was in terms one consisting of
certain specified assets. While the cash which might be on hand
at a certain future date was included, its amount was not and
could not be stated. The other assets were to be converted into
cash; but this was to be effected by trustees, under an active
trust which might endure for a considerable period of time.
These trustees were substantially in the position of liquidators.
The sums which they might ultimately realize and pay over were
uncertain. The beneficiaries of the trust, to whom the payments
were to be made, were to receive them not as shareholders in the
company, but because they had formerly been shareholders.
The $10,000 received by the society’s committee is therefore
to be regarded as a part of the accumulated property or “ floating
capital ” of the corporation distributed in liquidation, and belongs
wholly to the capital of the trust fund. (Gifford vs. Thompson,
115 Mass., 478; D’Ooge vs. Leeds, 176 ib., 558, 57 Northeastern
Rep., 1025.)
The Superior Court is so advised.
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Re: Share of Stock Represents Shareholders' Interest
Capital and Net Earnings.

in

Extract of Case and Decision:
James B. Jermain, Respondent, vs. The Lake Shore and
Michigan Southern Railway Company, Appellant, 160, 94 (91
N.
483, etc.). Court of Appeals, State of New York.

Where a dividend upon its stock is declared by a cor
poration it belongs to the holders of the stock at the time
of the declaration, without regard to the source from
which, or the time during which, the funds divided were
acquired by the corporation.
(Argued February 1, 1883; decided March 6, 1883.)
Earl (Judge). This action was brought to compel the de
fendant to declare and pay dividends of 10 per cent. per annum
from June, 1857, to February, 1863, upon certain shares of guar
anteed stock owned by the plaintiff. The facts in this case are
the same as those found in the case of Boardman vs. The Lake
Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company (84 N. Y.,
157), except that in that case the certificate of stock was dated
November 26, 1862, and in this case it is dated December 12, 1870.
. . . A share of stock represents the interest which the
shareholder has in the capital and net earnings of the corporation.
The interest is of an abstract nature, that is, the shareholder can
not by any act of his, nor ordinarily by any act of the law, re
duce it to possession. He can take, and is entitled to take, the
surplus profits when a dividend has been declared by the proper
officers of the corporation, and upon dissolution of the corpora
tion he can take his share of the assets thereof left for distribu
tion, pro rata, among the shareholders. The corporation repre
sents the whole body of the shareholders and to it, before a
dividend has been declared, belong, in solido, all the assets in
which the shareholders, as such, are interested. When a dividend
has once been declared out of net earnings, the amount of such
dividend is no longer a part of the assets of the company, but is
appropriated or set apart for the shareholders. They receive
credit for the dividends and the corporation simply holds them as
their trustee. Therefore, before a dividend has been declared, a
share of stock represents the whole interest which the share
holder has in the corporation, and when he transfers his stock he
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transfers his entire interest, and dividends subsequently declared,
without reference to the source from which or the time during
which the funds divided were acquired by the corporation,
necessarily belong to the holder of the stock at the time of the
declaration.
It is not the intention to refer particularly to the final holding in this
lengthy decision. The above extract is merely quoted to cite the court’s
opinion as to a share of stock representing the shareholders’ interest in the
capital as well as the accumulated net earnings.

Re : Stock Dividend Held to be Principal.
Statement of Case and Decision—(Extract).
Gibbons vs. Mahon (U. S. Reports 136), the Supreme Court,
October Term, 1889. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia.
Argued December 19, 20, 1888; decided May 19, 1890.
Statement of the Case: Under a will bequeathing stock in a
corporation and government bonds, in trust to pay “ the dividends
of said stock and the interest of said bonds as they accrue ” to a
daughter of the testator “ during her lifetime, without percentage
of commission or diminution of principal,” and directing that
upon her death ” the said stocks, bonds and income shall revert
to the estate ” of the trustee, “ without incumbrance or impeach
ment of waste,” a stock dividend declared by a corporation which
from time to time, before and after the death of the testator, has
invested accumulated earnings in its permanent work and plant,
and which, since his death, has been authorized by statute to in
crease its capital stock, is an accretion to capital, and the income
thereof only is payable to the tenant for life.
This was a bill in equity by Mary Ann Gibbons against Jane
Owen Mahon to compel the transfer to the plaintiff of shares in
the Washington Gas Light Co., held by the defendant under the
will of Ann W. Smith.
Mrs. Smith, a widow and the mother of both parties to this
suit, died March 26, 1895, owning 280 shares in that Company
and leaving a last will . . . containing the following be
quests: . . . (see Summary of Statement of case at
beginning.) .... ;................................................................
Argument for Appellant: On November 1, 1868, the board of
directors of the company adopted the following resolution:
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“ Whereas the construction account of this company exceeds one
million of dollars, and as the capital of the company has been in
creased by an act of Congress to one million of dollars, There
fore be it Resolved, That, The increased stock be awarded
among the stockholders, share for share, as they stood on the
first of October, 1868.”
On September 29, 1868, the defendant surrendered to the com
pany the certificate for the 280 shares mentioned in Mrs. Smith’s
will, and those shares were transferred on the books of the com
pany to the name of the defendant, as trustee; and on November
17, 1868, the company made out and delivered to the defendant, as
trustee, a certificate for the 560 shares.
The defendant paid to the plaintiff from time to time the divi
dends afterwards declared on the 560 shares, but never trans
ferred to her the 280 new shares.
The court dismissed the bill . . . and the plaintiff ap
pealed to this court . . .
Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented ... is whether the 280 new
shares of stock in the Washington Gas Light Co. are to be
treated as dividends to the whole, or part of the principal to
which the plaintiff is entitled under the will, or are to be treated
as an increase of the capital of the trust fund and the plaintiff
therefore entitled to receive only the income thereof.
The court below held that the new shares must be treated as
capital, the income only of which was payable to the plaintiff
. . . upon full consideration of the case, on reason and
authority, Court is of opinion that the decision below is correct.
Reserved and accumulated earnings so long as they are held
and invested by the corporation, being part of its corporate prop
erty, it follows that the interest therein, represented by each
share, is capital and not income, of that share as between the life
tenant and the remainderman, legal or equitable thereof.
In ascertaining the rights of such persons, the intention of
the testator, so far as manifested by him, must of course control;
but when he has given no special direction upon the question as
to what shall be considered principal and what income, he must
be presumed to have had in view the lawful power of the cor
poration over the use and apportionment of its earnings, and to
have intended that the determination of that question should
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depend upon the regular action of the corporation with regard
to all its shares.
Therefore, when a distribution of earnings is made by a cor
poration among its stockholders, the question whether such dis
tribution is an apportionment of additional stock representing
capital, or a division of profits and income, depends upon the
substance and intent of the action of the corporation, as mani
fested by its vote or resolution; and ordinarily a dividend de
clared in stock is to be deemed capital, and a dividend in money
is to be deemed income, of each share.
Opinion: A stock dividend really takes nothing from the
property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of
the shareholders. Its property is not diminished and their in
terests are not increased. After such a dividend, as before, the
corporation has the title in all the corporate property; the aggre
gate interests therein of all the shareholders are represented by
the whole number of shares; and the proportional interest of
each shareholder remains the same. The only change is in the
evidence which represents that interest, the new shares and the
original shares together representing the same proportional in
terest that the original shares represented before the issue of the
new ones.
Opinion: From the beginning of this century, it has been
established, by decisions of the Court of Chancery in England,
and of the House of Lords on appeal from Scotland, that where a
bank having no power by law to increase its capital stock, has
used its accumulated profits as a floating capital, and invested
them in securities which can be turned into cash at pleasure, an
extraordinary dividend or bonus declared out of such profits is
capital, and not income, of each share, as between owners of the
life interest and of the interest in remainder therein, without in
quiring into the time when the profits were actually earned.
In William vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 N. Y., 162,
the Court of Appeals said . . . When a corporation has a
surplus, whether a dividend shall be made and if made how much
it shall be and when and where it shall be payable rests in the
fair and honest discretion of the directors uncontrollable by the
courts. . . . Desiring to use the surplus and add it to the
permanent capital of the company, and having lawfully created
shares of stock they could issue to the stockholders such shares
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to represent their respective interests in such surplus. After a
stock dividend a corporation has just as much property as it had
before. . . . After such a dividend the aggregate of the
stockholders own no more interest in the corporation than before.
The whole number of shares before the stock dividend represented
the whole property of the corporation and after the dividend they
represent that and no more. A stock dividend does not distri
bute properly but simply dilutes the shares as they existed before.
(93 N. Y., 192-189.)
To hold the plaintiff to be entitled to the whole of the new
shares issued to the defendant would be to allow the plaintiff
the exclusive benefit of earnings, the greater part of which had
accrued and had been invested by the company as capital before
her interest began, and would be contrary to all the authorities.
To award to her a proportion of these shares, based upon an ac
count of how much of those earnings actually accrued after the
death of the testatrix, would be to substitute the estimate of the
court for the discretion of the corporation, lawfully exercised
through its directors, and would be open to the practical in
convenience already stated.
The resolution is clearly an apportionment of the new shares
as representing capital, and not a distribution or division of in
come—as well observed by Mr. Justice James “ delivering the
opinion of the court below: Certificates of stock are simply the
representative of the interest which the stockholder has in the
capital of the corporation. Before the issue of these 280 new
shares this trustee held precisely the same interest in this in
creased plant in the capital of the corporation that she held after
wards. She merely had a new representative of an interest that
she already owned and which was not increased by the issue of
the new shares. A dividend is something with which the cor
poration parts but it parted with nothing in issuing this new
stock. It simply gave a new evidence of ownership which already
existed. They were not in any sense therefore dividends for
which this trustee had to account to the “ cestui que Trust.” She
stood after the issue of the new shares just as she had stood be
fore and the trustee was obliged to treat them just as she did—
namely, as part of the original and to pay the dividends to the
cestui que Trust (4 Mackey, 136.)
Decree affirmed.
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Re : Stock Dividend Held

to be

Income.

Statement of Case of Decision:
Charles McLouth, Respondent, and Pliny T. Sexton, Appel
lant, as Trustees under the will of Caroline Cuyler, Deceased, vs.
George C. Hunt, et al., Respondents.
1. appeal—Testamentary Trust. Where there remains a pos
sibility that the contingencies contemplated by a will, upon which
remainders to the immediate beneficiaries of a trust may be de
feated, will happen, the question as to whether certain items are
to be treated as income or as capital is one in which the trustees
have a legal interest sufficient to warrant an appeal.
2. life tenant and remainderman. Where a will creates
separate trusts in favor of each of certain persons in being, who
are to receive the respective incomes until they arrive at a certain
age and then are to receive the corpus, such beneficiaries are to
be considered as life tenants before reaching the specified age and
as remaindermen thereafter; and the principles governing those
relations are applicable to questions as to whether items of the
trust property are to be treated as income or as capital.
6. stock dividends. When a stock dividend, declared by a
corporation and allotted to shares of its original capital stock be
longing to a testamentary trust estate, constitutes, as matter of
fact, a distribution of accumulated earnings or profits, it represents
income and belongs to the life tenant of the trust estate as between
him and the remainderman.
7. accumulated earnings on corporate stock. When
questions arise under a will, between life tenant and remainder
man, with respect to accumulated earnings upon capital stock of
a corporation, the courts must determine them according to the
nature and substance of the thing, and are not concluded from
treating such earnings as income by the form of their distribution
or by the terms employed by the corporation.
McLouth vs. Hunt, 92 Hun, 607, affirmed.
(Argued October 7, 1897; decided November 23, 1897.)
Appeal from a judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the fifth judicial department, entered January 25, 1896,
which affirmed a judgment entered upon the report of a referee.
The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are
stated in the opinion.
Pliny T. Sexton, Trustee, appellant in person. The certificate
for twenty-five and four-tenths shares of the increased capital
stock of the Western Union Telegraph Company, received there
from in December, 1892, by the trustees under the will of Mrs.
Cuyler, as their portion of said company’s 10 per cent. stock
dividend, simply constitute, together with the certificate pre
viously held for 254 shares of the capital stock of said company,
the evidence of said trustees’ title to the same relative interest in,
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or proportionate ownership of said company, which, before said
stock dividend, was equally and alone represented by said old
certificate for 254 shares. Said stock dividend did not increase or
alter the said trustees’ relative interest in, or proportionate
ownership of said company or the character thereof. Such
ownership, in its entirety, remains, as before, a part of the prin
ciple of the trust estates in the custody of said trustees, and said
twenty-five and four-tenths shares of said company’s increased
capital stock are not income of said trust estates, and cannot law
fully be distributed as such to the current beneficiaries of such
income, but must be retained for the remainderman of said trust
estates. (Burrall vs. R. R. R. Co., 75 N. Y., 211; City of Utica
vs. Churchill, 33 N. Y., 237; in re: Gerry, 103 N. Y., 145; Gold
smith vs. Swift, 25 Hun, 201; Hiscock vs. Lacy, 9 Misc. Rep.,
578; Hyatt vs. Allen, 56 N. Y., 553; Riggs vs. Cragg, 26 Hun,
89; 89 N. Y., 487; Williams vs. W. U. T. Co., 93 N. Y., 189.)
Charles McLouth, Trustee, respondent in person. The West
ern Union stock dividend should be regarded as income. (In re:
Kernochan, 104 N. Y., 18; Riggs vs. Cragg, 89 N. Y., 487;
Goldsmith vs. Swift, 25 Hun, 201; Hyatt vs. Allen, 56 N. Y.,
553.)
William H. Shuart and Joseph A. Addlington for George
C. Hunt, et al, respondents. The stock dividend of twenty-five
and four-tenths shares of stock of the Western Union Telegraph
Company is income, and should be turned over to the beneficiaries
now, and should not be retained as a part of the principal of the
trust estate which they are not to receive until they respectively
become thirty-five years of age.
O’Brien (Judge). This was an action to procure a judicial
construction of the provisions of the will, and incidentally for an
accounting by the trustees of a testamentary trust. Caroline
Cuyler died on the 18th day of September 1888, leaving a will
with two codicils, which were admitted to probate. The plain
tiffs are the executors of the will and trustees under the trust
created thereby. The testatrix, after making various general and
specific bequests and devises to collateral relatives, friends and
institutions of charity, disposed of the residue of her estate in
trust, for the benefit of three grandchildren named therein.
That my executors pay over to the use and benefit of each of
my said grandsons, respectively, during their or his minority such
portion of the income of said three parts for their support, main
tenance or education as in the discretion of my executors may
seem proper.
There was also included in the trust, under the same direc
tions, 254 shares of the capital stock of the Western Union Tele
graph Company, upon which the trustees received a stock divi
dend of 10 per cent on the tenth day of November, 1892, repre
sented by certificates issued to them for twenty-five and four37

tenths additional shares. This dividend was declared upon the
surplus earnings of the corporation.
It appears that in the administration of this trust a difference
of opinion arose between the two trustees with respect to their
duties, and with respect to the distribution of certain items
claimed by the one to be income and by the other to be capital.
It was for the purpose of adjusting this dispute in an amicable
spirit that this action was brought to obtain a construction of the
will and a direction to the trustees with respect to their duties and
obligations.
Mr. Sexton, one of the trustees, contends:
(2 ) That the stock dividends upon the Western Union stock
was not income payable to the life tenants, but an accession to the
capital which goes to the remaindermen.
Mr. McLouth, one of the trustees, and the three grandchildren
defendants, on the other hand, insist upon just the contrary of
these two propositions, and in their contention they have been
sustained by the courts below.
At least one, if not both of these questions, have been the
subject of discussion in the courts of this country and England
for a century. The decisions, though numerous, are singularly
conflicting and unsatisfactory. It is not necessary in the dis
position of this case to review them or to attempt to reconcile
the conflict, even if that were possible. The whole subject has
been in recent years carefully examined and elaborately discussed
in the courts of this country, and, while the conflict still exists,
it is possible, from a study of the decisions and a careful con
sideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, to
arrive at a conclusion which will be equitable and just and will
have the support substantially of the more recent authorities upon
the questions, as expressed in judicial decisions and by text
writers.
Notwithstanding the conflict of authority to which I have
just referred, there is one principle or rule applicable to this
case, with respect to which the parties are all at agreement, and
that is that the questions are not to be determined by any arbitrary
rule, but by ascertaining, when that can be done, the meaning and
intention of the testatrix, to be derived from the language em
ployed in the creation of the trust, from the relations of the parties
to each other, their condition and all the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case.
With respect to the stock dividends upon the stock of the
Western Union Telegraph Company, embraced in the trust, it is
important to notice the finding of the referee. For the purpose
of the case the parties stipulated, and the referee found, that in
the fall of 1892 the Western Union Telegraph Company, by a
capitalization of accumulated earnings made and retained in its
hands, from time to time, increased its capital stock from $86,38

200,000 to $100,000,000, and predicated thereon made a stock
dividend of 10 per cent. to its stockholders, under which the
plaintiffs received in December of that year from the corporation
a certificate for twenty-five and four-tenths additional shares of
stock, making, with the 254 shares previously held by them,
279 4-10 shares.
There is doubtless much stronger and more weighty authority
to support the contention of the appellant with respect to this
question than the one just considered. We will not attempt any
extended or critical analysis of the numerous cases in which the
question whether such a dividend is to be treated as capital or
income has been discussed and decided. It would enlarge the
scope of the discussion beyond all reasonable limits, and in the
end answer no useful purpose. It is quite sufficient to say that
they are in hopeless conflict, though, as it seems to us, the general
trend of the more recent ones, as well as the weight of argument
and reason, sustain the decision in this case. With respect to this
question the appeal is sought to be sustained, first, by a class of
cases in England founded upon Brander vs. Brander (4 Vesey,
800).
Then proceeding to notice the argument now made in this
case, that there is a distinction between stock and cash dividends,
he disposed of that contention with a homely but expressive re
mark. He said: “ As to the distinction between stock and
money, that is too thin; and if the law is that this extraordinary
profit, if given in the shape of stock, shall be considered capital,
it must be capital if given as money.”
The rule as thus established in England was followed in
Massachusetts, more as one of convenience than of justice, in a
line of cases that are not quite consistent with each other.
The Supreme Court of the United States laid down the same
rule in Gibbons vs. Mahon (136 U. S., 549), evidently following
the doctrine of the English and Massachusetts cases. . . .
The rule for the determination of the question whether stock
dividends were to be treated as income or an apportionment of
capital, was stated by the learned justice in the following
language: “ When a distribution of earnings is made by a cor
poration among its stockholders, the question whether such distri
bution is an apportionment of additional stock representing capi
tal, or a division of profits and income, depends upon the sub
stance and intent of the action of the corporation as manifested
by its vote or resolution.” In this case the resolution recites that
the earnings of the corporation had been withheld from the
shareholders for almost ten years; that they had accumulated, and
that it was the intention of the directors in taking such action, and
the shareholders in consenting to it, to distribute such accumu
lated earnings to the shareholders in the form of stock certificates
instead of money. It was, therefore, the substance and intent of
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the corporate action to distribute earnings rather than apportion
additional capital. There was, in fact, no additional capital
added. The capital of a corporation is the money or property that
it has after deducting its debts. The Western Union Telegraph
Company had no more property after passing this resolution than
it had before, and, hence, no more capital. When the resolution
was carried out it had, indeed, more capital stock outstanding, as
represented by certificates, but not a single dollar had been added
to its capital. It had nothing after passing the resolution that
it did not have before. So that, within the rule stated by the
learned justice, what the shareholder got in this case represented
income and was income. When the substance of the transaction
is analyzed, it will be seen that what the corporation really did
was to issue to the shareholders its own obligations in the form
of stock certificates against the accumulated earnings which it
had on hand, and these certificates having a market value could
readily be converted into money by the shareholders. So that the
transaction was, in substance, a distribution of profits.
In Riggs vs. Cragg (89 N. Y., 487) it was said by Chief
Judge Andrews: “ The right to stock dividends as between
life tenant and remainderman, has not been considered by the
court of last resort in this state. The decisions upon the subject
in other states and in England are conflicting, and it will be the
duty of this court, when occasion arises, to seek to settle the
question upon principle, and establish a practical rule for the
guidance of trustees and others, which shall be just and equitable
as between the beneficiaries of the two estates.” This statement,
with respect to the attitude of his court upon the question, was
doubtless correct. But since this utterance was made, cases have
been decided in this court which it will be found exceedingly
difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the early English cases
and those of Massachusetts. (In re: Kernochan, 104 N. Y., 618;
in re: Gerry, 103 N. Y., 451; Monson vs. N. Y. Sec. and Tr. Co.,
140 N. Y., 498; in re: Dewey, 153 N. Y., 63.)
In so far as this court has touched the question at all since the
decision in Riggs vs. Cragg, nothing certainly can be found in
the cases to sustain the contention of the appellant. The ques
tion had, however, been passed upon in the Supreme Court, upon
full consideration, and the doctrine of the English cases and
those of Massachusetts had been repudiated.
In each of these cases the court was entirely unembarrassed
by any previous impressions or decisions. The question was new,
and from the conflict of authority in other jurisdictions the courts,
with admirable judgment and discrimination, proceeded to de
termine the question upon principle. It was held in each case
that stock dividends, such as the one now under consideration,
represented income, and in justice an equity properly belonged
to the life tenant.
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When questions arise under a will between parties standing
in such relations to each other, with respect to the right to ac
cumulated earnings upon capital stock, the courts must determine
the questions for themselves, according to the nature and sub
stance of the thing which the corporation has assumed to transfer
from one to the other, and they are not concluded by mere names
or forms. For all corporate purposes the corporation may doubt
less convert earnings into capital, when such power is conferred
by its charter, but when a question arises between life tenants and
remaindermen concerning the ownership of the earnings thus
converted the action of the corporation will not conclude the
courts.
The decision of the learned referee in awarding the stock
dividend to the life tenants as earnings or income, and in refusing
to charge them with the premium upon the bonds, or that part of
it that has disappeared by the lapse of time, is equitable and just,
and, we think, is supported by reason and authority.
The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs to all
parties payable out of the income of the fund.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.

Re: Stock Dividend Held to be Income.
Statement of Case and Decision:
Edmund J. Lowry, Respondent, vs. The Farmers’ Loan and
Trust Company et al., Appellants, impleaded with others.
1. Corporations—Stock Dividends Declared out of Profits
Represent Income Not Capital. Where a corporation has de
clared a dividend upon its capital stock payable in new stock
certificates, if it is based upon an accumulation of earnings or
profits, by their distribution in that manner the stockholders re
ceive the representative of income and not of capital.
2. Trusts—When Life Beneficiary is Entitled to Stock Divi
dends as Income. Where the will of a testator creates a trust
during the life of a beneficiary with remainder to his heirs and
directs that the entire income of the securities of the trust fund
is to be applied as income and that no part of such income shall
be diverted to the formation of a sinking fund to replace any
loss of the principal by depreciation in value of the securities,
such provisions, with others indicating a comprehensiveness of
intention with respect of enjoyment by the beneficiary of the in
come in connection with the source of the dividend itself, entitle
the life tenant and not the remainderman to a stock dividend de
clared out of “ an accumulated net surplus ” upon the stock of a
corporation in which a portion of the trust estate was invested.
Lowry vs. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 56 App. Div., 408,
affirmed.
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(Argued June 19, 1902; decided October 7, 1902.)
Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered March
8, 1901, upon an order reversing a judgment in favor of defend
ants entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on
trial at Special Term and directing judgment for the plaintiff.
The action involves the construction of the provisions of the
will of John Lowry, who died in 1895. In the seventh clause, the
will set apart one-fourth of the residuary estate, to be held by the
Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, in trust to apply the rents,
issues and profits thereof to the use of the testator’s widow, until
her death, or remarriage; in either of which events the trust
property should go “ to increase the portion of the estate held in
trust for the benefit of my children as hereinafter stated.” By
the second subdivision of the same clause, the residuary estate
was to be divided by the executor, the defendant trust company,
into shares for the testator’s children and one of said shares was
given to it “ in trust, to receive the rents, issues and profits there
of, and to apply the same to the use of each one of my children
who may survive me, during the natural life of such child, and,
after the death of each child, to pay over the principal of such
trust fund to the right heirs of such deceased child.” The
eleventh clause of the will provided that “ The trustee under my
will and its successor, in addition to the ordinary powers of trus
tees in such cases, shall have full power to retain the trust fund
in any securities in which the same may be invested at the time
of my death,” and that “ When any investment of trust funds has
been made by purchase of securities, such securities shall form
part of the principal of the trust fund and follow the trust; and
the entire income from such securities shall be applied as income,
irrespective of the price paid for the securities or the subsequent
value thereof; it being my will that no part of such income shall
be diverted to form a sinking fund to replace any loss to the
principal by depreciation in value of the securities.” The plaintiff
is one of the surviving children of the testator and brought this
action to compel the trustee to account for, and to pay over to
him, an extra dividend of 50 per cent., which had been declared
upon the capital stock of the Pullman Palace Car Company, pay
able in certificates of stock at par value. The testator’s estate
comprehended fifty shares of the stock; eight of which formed
part of the trust estate held for plaintiff. The dividend had been
declared and paid from the “ accumulated net surplus at the
credit of income account ”; as the same appeared in the accounts
of the company. This accumulation of surplus had existed at
approximately the same figure for a time prior to testator’s death.
At the Special Term, the complaint was dismissed; upon the
ground that the stock dividend should be treated as principal and,
therefore, should be held for the remaindermen. The Appellate
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Division of the first department, holding that the stock dividend
should be treated as income, reversed that judgment and ordered
a judgment for the plaintiff. The trust company thereupon
appealed to this court.
David McClure for the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company,
appellant. The testator, at the time of his death, as a shareholder
of the car company, had a fixed right in reference to all the assets
of the corporation in the ratio which the number of shares held
by him sustained toward the entire capital stock of the corpora
tion. (Germain vs. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 91 N. Y., 483; Burrall
vs. B. R. R. Co., 75 N. Y., 211; Kent vs. Q. M. Co., 78 N. Y.,
159; People ex rel. vs. Coleman, 126 N. Y., 433; Plimpton vs.
Bigelow, 93 N. Y., 502.) The laws of this state recognize the
fact that the interest of a decedent in the surplus of a corporation
at the time of his death is capital and not income. (Matter of
Bronson, 150 N. Y., 1; Matter of Fitch, 160 N. Y., 87.) A stock
dividend neither increases nor diminishes the assets of the cor
poration, but only indicates a transformation in the manner in
which the property of the corporation is held. (Williams vs.
W. U. T. Co., 93 N. Y., 162; Rogers Case, 22 App. Div., 428.)
The stock dividend in the present case should be declared to be
principal and not income. (Matter of Rogers, 161 N. Y., 108.)
Alfred Roelker, Jr., for Muriel Valentine, appellant.
Clinton E. Bell and Eugene H. Lewis for respondent. A
corporation is a distinct and separate entity apart from its share
holders, who have merely choses in action against the separate
entity. (Burden vs. Burden, 159 N. Y., 287; Jermain vs. L. S.
& M. S. R. Co., 91 N. Y., 483; Plimpton vs. Bigelow, 93 N. Y.,
592; Vail vs. Hamilton, 85 N. Y., 453; Matter of Bronson, 150
N. Y., 17; Matter of Whiting, 150 N. Y., 27; Matter of Morgan,
150 N. Y., 235.) A stockholder in the absence of bad faith has
no legal or equitable title to surplus profits of a going concern
until the declaration of a dividend. (Greff vs. E. L. Assurance
Society, 160 N. Y., 19; Hyatt vs. Allen, 56 N. Y., 553; Gold
smith vs. Swift, 25 Hun, 201; Button vs. Hoffman, 61 Wis., 20;
Burden vs. Burden, 159 N. Y., 287.) The testator’s intention
should be construed in accordance with the foregoing established
principles of corporation law, taking into consideration the ex
press language of the will, the scope and purpose of the will as a
whole, together with all the surrounding circumstances, and con
sidering especially the relationship of the testator to the plaintiff.
(Du Bois vs. Ray, 35 N. Y., 162; Matter of Hoyt, 160 N. Y., 607;
Hyatt vs. Allen, 56 N. Y., 553; Steinway vs. Steinway, 163 N. Y.,
197; Clarkson vs. Clarkson, 18 Barb., 646; Matter of Gerry, 103
N. Y., 451; Matter of N. Y. Life Ins. & T. Co., 53 N. Y. Supp.,
382.) Where a testator leaves as part of his estate shares of stock,
the income of which he desires to be paid to his children, and the
corporation in which the testator held such stock continues its cor
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porate existence and declares an extra dividend out of accumu
lated earnings, whether such dividend be in cash or stock, such
dividend shall be paid to the life tenant, without reference to the
time when it may have been earned by the corporation. (Riggs
vs. Cragg, 89 N. Y., 479; Clarkson vs. Clarkson, 18 Barb., 464;
Matter of Woodruff, 1 Yuck., 58; Goldsmith vs. Swift, 25 Hun,
201; Matter of Kernochan, 104 N. Y., 618; Matter of Warren,
33 N. Y. S. R., 584; Matter of Prime, N. Y. L. J., March 6, 1891;
McLouth vs. Hunt, 154 N. Y., 179; Matter of Hoyt, 160 N. Y.,
615.) The distinction made by the court below between a stock
dividend and a cash dividend is a distinction without a difference
for the purposes of this case. (Riggs vs. Cragg, 26 Hun, 89;
89 N. Y., 479.) Any apportionment of the earnings of a going
concern is contrary to the established law of this state. (Riggs
vs. Cragg, 26 Hun, 89; Simpson vs. Moore, 30 Barb., 637; Gold
smith vs. Swift, 25 Hun, 201; Matter of Rogers, 22 App. Div.,
428; 161 N. Y., 108.) To decide that the stock dividend is
principal of the estate is to imply an illegal and void intention on
the part of the testator. (Manning vs. Q. S. M. Co., 24 Hun,
360; Hascall vs. King, 162 N. Y., 134; Pray vs. Hegeman, 92
N. Y., 508; Matter of Rogers, 22 App. Div., 428.) The court
will not imply a void and illegal intention, but, where two inter
pretations are possible, the court will choose the one making the
will valid. (Hopkins vs. Kent, 145 N. Y., 367; Tilden vs. Green,
130 N. Y., 66; Arthur vs. Arthur, 3 App. Div., 378.)
Gray (Judge). The object of this action was to have it deter
mined that, as between the plaintiff, the beneficiary of a trust
created by the testator’s will, and those entitled in remainder to
the trust fund, the shares of stock received by the trustee, in pay
ment of a dividend of 50 per cent., which had been declared by
the Pullman Palace Car Company upon its capital stock, were to
be regarded, and treated, as income of the trust estate. The ques
tion whether the life tenant of property, or the remainderman,
should have the dividend, which a corporation has declared and
made payable in certificates of its stock, has been a vexed one.
The decisions of the courts in this country and in England have
not been harmonious and in this state, it may be said, it had re
ceived no authoritative treatment by this court, until the decision
of the recent case of McLouth vs. Hunt (154 N. Y., 179).
Several decisions of the Supreme Court of this state had, pre
viously, given support to the doctrine that where a life tenant is
given the income and profits, and specifically, in some cases, divi
dends, all dividends, whether payable in cash or in certificates,
belonged to him. (Clarkson vs. Clarkson, 18 Barb., 646; Simp
son vs. Moore, 30 ib., 637; Riggs vs. Cragg, 26 Hun, 89.) When
the case of Riggs vs. Cragg came to this court (89 N. Y., 479),
this question, though passed upon below, was not decided; the
appeal being determined upon other grounds. It was there ob44

served in the opinion that the question had not been considered
by this court and that, in view of the conflict in the decisions
elsewhere, it would be its duty, when the occasion arose, to settle
the question upon principle. That occasion did arise; when the
appeal in McLouth vs. Hunt (supra) came before this court.
In McLouth vs. Hunt, the direction was to pay over to the bene
ficiary “ the full income ” and the question presented was, whether
a stock dividend, declared by the Western Union Telegraph
Company, some four years after the testator’s death, should be
treated as income, payable to the life tenant, or as accession to the
capital of the trust fund. The company, as the facts are stated,
in 1892, “by a capitalization of accumulated earnings made
and retained in its hands, from time to time, increased its capital
stock from $86,200,000 to $100,000,000 and, predicated thereon,
made a stock dividend of 10 per cent. to its stockholders;"
the
resolution reciting that the earnings of the corporation had been
withheld from the stockholders for almost ten years; that they
had accumulated, and that they were distributed in the form of
stock certificates instead of money. It was pointed out in the
opinion that the substance and intent of the corporate action was
to distribute earnings and that there was no addition made to the
capital; for, notwithstanding that there resulted an increase of
capital stock, the corporation had neither more property nor more
capital. It was held that the transaction, although in form of an
issue of stock certificates, was a distribution of the profits and that
what the stockholders got “ represented income and was income.”
The opinion discussed the question with some fullness, as an
undetermined one in this court, and a further review of the cases
is unnecessary now. Aside from cases which are substantially
parallel, in their facts and, therefore, within the precedent, under
the authority of McLouth vs. Hunt, courts will determine for
themselves, “ according to the nature and substance of the thing
which the corporation has assumed to transfer,” whether a divi
dend, when declared, represents income, or not. That case was a
stronger one, in some aspects, than the present one for the re
mainderman. The rule, as settled by that case, is that where a
corporation has declared a dividend upon its capital stock, pay
able in new stock certificates, if it is based upon an accumulation
of earnings, or profits, by their distribution in that manner, the
stockholders receive the representative of income and not of
capital. I do not think that it is possible to extinguish that case,
as an authority upon the question before us. It may be true, as
the appellant contends, that McLouth vs. Hunt declared no hard
and fast rule, that stock dividends are always to be treated as
income, and that each case must be decided upon its own facts;
but the general rule, which it enunciated, seems to apply very
exactly to the conditions of the present case.
In approaching the considerations of such a question, the
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language in which the gift is made to the beneficiary of a trust,
of the life tenant of the estate, must be regarded, in order to
determine, preliminarily, the comprehensiveness of the testator’s
intention, with respect to the enjoyment by the object of his
bounty of the yield of the intermediate estate. The transaction,
through which the property of the corporation is being distrib
uted in the extraordinary form of a stock dividend, is to be
looked into; in order that its true nature may appear and that a
determination may be reached whether capital, or an accumula
tion of profits on the capital, is being divided among the stock
holders. While the corporate action may not be, necessarily,
conclusive upon the court, with respect to the question, if it is
based upon facts, and is not purely arbitrary, it will, and should
be, controlling. In the first place, then, we have in this will a
provision made by a parent for his child; which gives to the
latter “ the rents, issues and profits ” of his equal share of the re
siduary estate, during his life. Upon the remarriage or the death
of the testator’s widow, that share is to be proportionately in
creased by the distribution of the one-fourth share, which had
been held in trust for the widow. Further, the testator directed
that the entire income of the securities of the trust fund was to be
applied and that no part should be diverted to the formation of a
sinking fund to replace any loss of the principal by depreciation
in value of the securities. These provisions, certainly, evidence
a comprehensive intention of the testator, that whatever was in
the nature of profits upon, or income of, the trust fund should
be fully enjoyed by the beneficiary. In the next place, we have
the trustee receiving from the Pullman Company, upon the shares
of its stock held in trust, a dividend of 50 per cent., paid out of
“ accumulated net surplus at the credit of income account,” in
certificates of new stock of the corporation. The fact of the
source of the dividend appeared from the company’s statement;
which showed an accumulation of net surplus from year to year,
for thirty-one years. A cash dividend of 20 per cent. had been
declared a short while previously, which the trustee had paid
over to the plaintiff. Had this dividend of 50 per cent. been
declared and paid in cash, would there have been much doubt
about the plaintiff’s right to receive it? (Matter of Kernochan,
104 N. Y., 618, 629.) What reasonable, or substantial, distinc
tion is there, in principle of ownership, between a dividend which
is paid in stock and one which is paid in money, when either is
based upon a division of earnings? Mr. Morawetz, in his work
on corporations (para. 468) has observed, with respect to such
stock dividends, that, “ in substance and effect, it amounts to a
distribution of profits among the shareholders in cash and a subse
quent purchase of new shares in the company with the sums
distributed.” It is true enough, as the appellant argues, that the
testator, at the time of his death, owned the right to share in the
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assets of the corporation, proportionately to the amount of stock
which he held; but it does not, therefore, follow that dividends,
thereafter made from the accumulations of earnings, must be
regarded and treated as additions to the capital of the trust
estate. All stockholders are interested in the operation of the
property of a corporation and their shares of stock represent
individual interests in the corporate enterprise, in its capital, as
in its net earnings; but the corporation itself has the legal title
to all the properties and holds them for their benefit. They have
a right to dividends, only as the corporate agents, in the exercise
of their discretion, may declare them (in the absence, of course,
of any question of bad faith, neglect, or abuse of discretion)
and they have the right to a pro rata distribution of the corporate
assets upon dissolution. (Jermain vs. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 91
N. Y., 483; Plimpton vs. Bigelow, 93 ib., 592; Matter of Bronson,
150 ib., 1; Greff vs. Equitable L. Assur. Soc’y., 160 ib., 19.)
The declaration of a dividend by a corporation in active opera
tion is the appropriation of a portion of the assets, which repre
sented the net earnings of the corporation, for the use of the
stockholders and, pro tanto, the assets are diminished. The
stock no longer represents them. The capital is unchanged; but
the value in the market of the shares may be affected by the
diminution in the amount of the corporate assets. That the
value of the shares of stock has been lessened by a dividend is a
fact of no relevancy in determining the question of whether the
dividend is to be regarded as income to the life tenant, or as
capital for the remainderman. That question will be determined
by the origin of the dividend. In this case, a fund had been
created by an accumulation of the net earnings of the corpora
tion and it remained a part of the general assets, until, in the
judgment of the directors, the time came when it was proper
and prudent to distribute it among the stockholders. That which
the directors of the corporation distribute among its stockholders,
without intrenching upon capital, must be comprehended within
the term “ profits ” and we should assume that the testator in
tended that what might be paid in that way should belong to the
beneficiary.
There is no question of diminishing the capital; nor of increas
ing the capital for any corporate purpose, or need. It was,
simply, a mode of distributing the profits earned by the employ
ment of the capital.
Enough has been said, in connection with the authority of
McLouth vs. Hunt to render the conclusion necessary that he
judgment of the Appellate Division should be affirmed; with
costs to the plaintiff and to the defendant trustee, to be paid out
of the principal of the fund.
Parker, Ch. J., O’Brien, Bartlett, Martin, Vann and Cullen,
J. J. concur.
Judgment accordingly.
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